This study examines the propensity of small firms to provide health insurance in response to high state-level unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, given that generous UI benefits reduce labor market frictions that constrain employee mobility. We exploit a unique data set of over 15,000 small private firms in the United States and find that when state UI benefits are high, firms will offer their employees health insurance benefits—especially when those firms rely on human capital that is difficult to replace. We find positive effects of health insurance policy on worker retention, worker productivity, and firm performance. We discuss the implications of our findings to the theory development on the relationship between exogenous labor market frictions and firms’ responses to those frictions.

We show that frictions in labor and capital markets can be a source of competitive advantage for affiliates of corporate groups over stand-alone firms in environments where benefits from internal markets’ flexibility are high. We argue that the advantage of flexibility in changing labor inputs is related to how difficult it is to change capital inputs. We predict that if substituting labor with capital is difficult, the group advantage of flexibly changing labor would be stronger in countries with high levels of financial development. Consistent with this prediction, we find a stronger competitive advantage for group affiliates in countries with rigid labor markets but flexible capital markets. In these environments, group affiliates are more prevalent and outperform stand-alone firms in terms of growth and profitability.

The Schumpeterian opportunity cost hypothesis predicts that firms concentrate innovative activities in recessions. However, empirical evidence suggests that innovative activities are procyclical. Theory proposes that firms shift R&D investments and innovation from recessions to booms to maximize returns by capturing high-demand periods before imitators compete away rents.